Develops a "global theory" on the nature of philosophy.

In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, (...) such as those of the Gettier type. (shrink)

Esse ensaio tematiza a absorcçáo do dominio da imaginacáo filosófica pelo da investigaçáo cientifica, considerando duas maneiras de ver contrastantes: a concepçáo de A. Comte, segundo a qual a metafisica faz parte de um estágio intermediario da evoluçáo do saber situado entre religiáo e ciencia, e a opiniáo de A. Kenny de que ao menos em seus temas centrais a filosofia ha de permanecer para sempre irredutivel a ciencia. Em minha conclusáo favorereço Comte contra Kenny. De um lado, esse ultimo (...) n áo consegue apresentar um suporte satisfatório para as suas ideias; de outro, basta uma breve olhada no vertiginoso e cada vez mais abrangente progresso contemporâneo da ciencia, para nos apercebermos de que certas ideias defendidas por Comte merecem reavaliac áo . Ele estava apontando para a direc áo certa, ainda que pudesse enganar-se seriamente quanta as dimensõe s e a natureza do território a ser percorrido. A novidade desse trabalho n áo está, todavia, em seu argumento geral, mas na tentativa de uma analise da natureza dos conceitos metafisicos com base em Comte (secáo 4). (shrink)

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In this paper is developed a reconstructive analysis of the conditions for both utterances constative and performative. These conditions were not presented by Austin (in that way), but we must deal with them, if we want that the distinction works. Under the light of this analysis is shown -against Austin -no compelling ground for the rejection of the distinction.